

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 20 August 1968, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY

(United Kingdom)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

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| <u>Poland:</u> | Mr. H. JAROSZEK Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI Mr. H. STEPOSZ |

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO

Mr. O. IONESCO

Mr. V. TARZIORU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. A. EDELSTAM

Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
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Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF

Mr. O. SIRRY

Mr. A.R. ELREEDY

Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUNN

Mr. C. GLEYSTEEN

Mr. C.G. BREAN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the 391st plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): I feel I must ask for the indulgence of the Committee, because my statement today is fairly long, but in reality it consists of two statements.
3. First, I have the honour to inform the Committee that yesterday Sweden signed the non-proliferation treaty in London, Moscow and Washington. The following statement was issued on 15 August, when my Government took its decision:

"Since the General Assembly of the United Nations, on 12 June 1968, adopted a resolution^{1/} requesting all States to adhere to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons the question of Sweden's attitude to the treaty has been raised. This treaty is open for signature by nuclear-weapon as well as non-nuclear weapon States and so far it has been signed by some seventy States, among them the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. It is obvious that the effectiveness of the treaty is to a great extent dependent upon the adherence of as many States as possible.

"According to the treaty, the nuclear-weapon States undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or in any other way assist other countries to acquire such weapons. On the other hand, the non-nuclear-weapon States undertake not to receive or to manufacture nuclear weapons. The treaty includes an international safeguards system which should contribute to achieving a uniform international framework for the conduct of States. The rapidly growing commercial market for the peaceful use of atomic energy also makes it urgent to widen the adherence to a uniform safeguards system entailing technological and commercial conditions for equal competition. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna is to have the responsibility for carrying out that control.

^{1/} 2373 (XXII); ENDC/226*

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"After careful consideration the Government has arrived at the conclusion that Sweden should adhere to the treaty. The Government has decided to sign as soon as possible and then to submit a Government Bill to the Riksdag on the acceptance of the treaty. Not until the Riksdag has passed the Government Bill and the instrument of ratification has subsequently been deposited can the treaty enter into force as far as Sweden is concerned.

"Swedish adherence is in concurrence with our general policy of co-operating to the best of our ability towards the relaxation of tension and towards disarmament in the world. The treaty should contribute to international stability and facilitate further measures towards an early cessation of the arms race and towards disarmament in the field of nuclear weapons.

"The Government is of the opinion that the treaty will not impede development and an expanded use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in those States which forgo nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the treaty may imply improved possibilities in this field for many of these States.

"The Government has based its decision on the knowledge that many States which are of importance to Sweden in those respects have already signed or are expected to sign the treaty. The Government has also assumed that the great Powers, whose possession of nuclear weapons is not directly affected by the treaty, will make every effort to fulfil their undertakings to make definitive progress in their own disarmament measures. In the first place the Swedish expectations are centred on the following especially important measures.

an agreement between the great Powers to restrict their offensive and defensive strategic nuclear missile systems;

maintenance of the international Moscow Treaty of 1963 on a partial ban on tests of nuclear weapons; and

the supplementing of this Treaty by a ban on underground nuclear explosions and, in connexion therewith,

the regulation, under an international régime, of the exemptions from these prohibitions which, in special cases, may be desirable for peaceful purposes."

4. The main part of my statement today will be devoted to the question of biological and chemical (B and C) means of warfare.

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5. First of all, I want to express the gratification of my delegation that this subject has now achieved prominence among possible measures of agreed disarmament. The Swedish Government has for a long time wished that negotiations should start on reducing the risks of man destroying man by using modern science to spread disease and disaster. We have been asking ourselves, and our military leaders have underscored, the anguished question: when will something at last be done to pre-empt the tremendous uncertainties which must prevail as long as such easily-concealed weapons of mass destruction may be produced and stored -- nobody knows in what quantities and where? We called for action in this field through interventions in the United Nations as long ago as 1955, suggesting an examination of what should be deemed to fall under the concept of "means of mass destruction". Also it may be recalled that at the outset of the negotiations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1962, we asked whether B and C weapons should not be eliminated in the first stage of a plan for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/PV.35, p.36).

6. Consideration of B and C warfare is now definitely required, as the United Nations has recently given the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a specific mandate to pursue work in this field:

"Noting that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has the task of seeking an agreement on the cessation of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and on the elimination of all such weapons from national arsenals, as called for in the draft proposals on general and complete disarmament now before the Conference." (General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI); ENDC/185)

A special note of urgency was reserved in that resolution for a call for strict observance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and an invitation to all States to accede to that Protocol -- and quite justifiably so, since we must first make effective the agreed prohibition, that is on the use of such means of warfare, before going on to study how to eliminate them.

7. This year the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has, moreover, been spurred on by several delegations to make progress in this field as a partial measure. We have two documents before us containing concrete proposals. Point 6 of the memorandum by the Government of the USSR on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament (ENDC/227) urges that the Conference should consider ways and means of securing observance by all States of the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the

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use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The United Kingdom working paper on microbiological warfare (ENDC/231), presented by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mulley, on 6 August (ENDC/PV.387), has given us much valuable food for thought, suggesting, as it does, action that may extend beyond the Geneva Protocol. Mr. Mulley pointed out what he considered to be a number of shortcomings in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, namely:

- (i) that all States are not parties to it and that some have made important reservations in their adherence;
- (ii) that there is no consensus whether the Protocol represents customary law or is purely contractual;
- (iii) that the risks of use of B and C weapons will exist as long as such weapons are produced;
- (iv) that there is disagreement whether the Protocol covers non-lethal gases;
- (v) that the term "bacteriological" is not sufficiently comprehensive to cover the range of agents that might be used; and
- (vi) that the applicability of the Protocol is doubtful in hostilities which do not amount to "war" in the technical sense.

8. The United Kingdom delegation suggests that the problems might become somewhat less intractable if chemical and biological means of warfare were treated separately. As to the former category, the United Kingdom delegation limits itself to proposing a report by the Secretary-General on the nature and possible effects of such weapons. As to what it terms "microbiological" methods of warfare, however, it emphasizes that they have never been used and that they are regarded with even greater abhorrence than chemical weapons, and it goes on to propose a supplement to the Geneva convention unequivocally prohibiting the use of these weapons.

9. Further, Mr. Mulley suggests that this prohibition be coupled with a ban on the production, and, lastly, with the elimination of stocks. To ensure the faithful observance of these obligations, the United Kingdom delegation suggests that research work should be open to international investigation, that a competent body of international experts should investigate certain allegations of breach, that the parties should be obliged to co-operate in the investigations, and, lastly, that the parties should support action in accordance with the United Nations Charter to counter use or threatened use of microbiological weapons.

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10. Mr. Mulley stated that his working paper was devised to stimulate discussion. The Swedish delegation is grateful for this very valuable injection of stimulus into the debate, and we also find the United Kingdom presentation, in its clarity, highly useful for sorting out our comments.

11. If now, on behalf of the Swedish delegation, I want to make some preliminary comments and tentative suggestions, it is not because my Government could have any claim to special experience in this field, except that we have devoted research to defence measures against such warfare. And we have -- if I dare refer to this as having any kind of special merit -- been most keen to make openly available a maximum of information in regard to the technicalities of chemical and biological methods of warfare.

12. For the purposes of our discussion I find it useful to start by listing first what must be our maximal desiderata in this field, and thereafter gradually narrow the discussion to what needs most particularly to be remedied and what, from a practical point of view, it seems possible to achieve in the relatively near future.

13. The desiderata, here as elsewhere, are the easiest part. To guarantee security the world community ought to be bound by:

First, a comprehensive prohibition of the use of B and C means of warfare, because they open up entirely new chapters in a book that already contains more than enough of horror and that should be made shorter, not longer;

Second, a non-armament agreement in the field of these means of warfare, similar in principle to the non-proliferation treaty to prevent further dissemination and to prevent production and stockpiling, because that is the most effective way to forestall the use of these means of warfare; and

Third, measures of B and C disarmament, that is to say destruction of existing stocks and equipment in order to impede immediate use of such means of warfare. It goes without saying that, in addition, one would want to see all the prohibitions which I have mentioned controlled as effectively as possible.

14. Let me now turn to what needs to be remedied and what it may be possible to remedy. I shall discuss first the prohibition of the use of B and C weapons. If any deficiency remains in the existing prohibition, the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should seek to correct it. The main instrument in this sphere, of course, is the Geneva Protocol of 1925, following on the Hague Conventions.

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15. It is a fact that not all States have adhered to the Geneva Convention. This is certainly a major shortcoming, which should be overcome, even if it is possible to maintain that the principles of the Protocol have become customary international law and are thus already binding on all. I need hardly recall that the General Assembly in resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 1966 called for strict observance by all States -- regardless of adherence -- of the principles and objectives of the Protocol and condemned all actions contrary to those objectives. That resolution was adopted almost unanimously, with no negative vote and with the support of all the permanent members of the Security Council.

16. The circumstances that some States have subjected their adherence to the Protocol to certain reservations, particularly against non-parties, would appear to be another deficiency. The explicit universal acceptance of the Protocol -- urged by the General Assembly -- should largely eliminate the deficiencies to which I have just referred and which, I think, are recognized by all.

17. On another point it is somewhat controversial whether or not a deficiency exists. This has regard to the extent of the prohibition of B and C means in the Geneva Protocol, particularly whether "bacteriological methods" should be interpreted as covering all "biological means". The United Kingdom working paper deals in detail with that point.

18. Several delegations, both here in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and earlier during the debate in the First Committee of the General Assembly last year, have maintained that the Geneva Protocol covers all conceivable biological and chemical weapons and that all that is needed is adherence by all and implementation by all. Other delegations maintain that the Protocol is obsolete and does not cover the biological and chemical weapons of greatest interest and danger. They favour revision or replacement of the Protocol. Of the representatives who have objected to the latter position, I might specifically refer to the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Christov, who very clearly warned against any action which might weaken the Geneva Protocol (ENDC/PV.390, para.56).

19. The Swedish delegation agrees with the position that nothing should be done that would damage or undermine the ban already expressed in the Geneva Protocol. We would be inclined to the view, moreover, that it would be both desirable and natural explicitly to give the Protocol a broad interpretation, precisely in order to retain it without amendment, and to consider all existing B and C weapons as belonging in one set and the prohibition to use any of them as valid without exceptions.

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20. At the same time our delegation cannot close its eyes to the fact -- the regrettable fact -- that others interpret the existing ban more narrowly and go by that interpretation. In order to avoid the sufferings and the risks of escalation that result, and may come to result, from such an interpretation, it might be desirable to take some step in order to secure universal acceptance and implementation of a fully-comprehensive ban on all B and C weapons. Mere debates about the merits and demerits of various existing interpretations tend to become sterile. They even risk reducing the area of agreement and entrenching the positions taken in the past. They do not attempt, in a positive way, to broaden the area of agreement. Therefore we suggest that some joint collective statement in the General Assembly or elsewhere might be useful which, without regard to the various positions and practices of the past as to the extent of the existing ban, would enable States to register adherence to a ban on all B and C means of warfare, comprehensively interpreted. That is our first, positive suggestion.

21. I want to turn next to the proposal made by several delegations for a report by the Secretary-General on the nature and effects of B and C means of warfare. The Swedish delegation warmly supports that proposal. It is very gratifying to find that the co-Chairmen also seem, as we understand it, to be agreed on such a procedure. The report last year by the Secretary-General on the effects of nuclear weapons (A/6858) proved of considerable value. A report concerning biological and chemical means of warfare and their effects should be equally useful to highlight those hidden horrors and thereby help us to proceed to eliminate them.

22. Such a report would serve the double purpose of both strengthening the existing prohibition of use of such weapons -- contained in the Geneva Protocol -- and supporting the continued work in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on new agreements, banning also their production and possession, a subject that evidently belongs in a different legal context. The accurate information offered by such a report would give scientific circles and also world public opinion sharpened arguments for demanding disarmament agreements also in regard to these hitherto largely unrevealed means of mass destruction.

23. There has been in this Committee some difference of view as to whether the report should cover both B and C means or only the latter. The Swedish delegation can see no objection to both being covered.

24. In this connexion it may be worth while to give somewhat fuller consideration to the United Kingdom working paper (ENDC/231), which suggests that the problems might be fewer if we were to treat chemical and what Mr. Mulley preferred to term "microbiological"

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weapons separately, in regard to the contemplated study as well as to international agreements. There are, of course, some valid arguments for such a procedure. As the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee is probably going to meet this issue often in the future, it is important to deal with the differing arguments right from the start. The Swedish delegation wants to state that to our mind the weightier arguments speak in favour of an attempt not to separate the treatment of B weapons from that of C weapons.

25. Let us first look at the political argument. The fact that some weapons may have been used cannot be an argument against their prohibition. While biological weapons in a narrow sense -- I mean those involving live materia that can multiply -- may not have been used in practice, biological means in a broader sense have been employed, just as have chemical means. However, I believe it is wise to look forward rather than backward. After all, the employment of gas in the First World War did not prevent but rather provoked the establishment of the Geneva Protocol. Is it unrealistic to think that recent uses of some B and C means have served to convince the world that the horrors of those weapons are such that they must all be banned? It seems to me that we are here confronted with the same attitude as that in regard to nuclear weapons.

26. Next we have the practical-legal argument. And we must admit that some differences between some B and C weapons do occur when we turn from questions of their use in international war -- where we hold that the ban in the Geneva Protocol should be considered as comprehensive -- to the question of banning all production and possession of such weapons. While biological weapons are not produced for use domestically, some chemical weapons are. However, it must also be recalled that if it is asserted that some chemicals may have a legitimate use in domestic riot control and so on, some biological agents have an even more legitimate role to play for medical purposes. Important quantities of biological agents are produced for legitimate purposes -- for instance, development and production of vaccines, antibiotics and chemical products. In many cases the methods are the same as for the production of biological means of warfare. Of course, no treaty should make medical progress impossible. I shall return briefly to this question when I deal with the matter of control.

27. Finally, we have the practical-scientific argument. Several types of weapons which are, alas, of great practical importance belong to categories which are considered by some as biological, by others as chemical. I am thinking particularly of herbicides and of toxins produced by live materia. Only if the prohibitions, and the Secretary-General's study were envisaged as comprehensively covering both B and C means could we

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be ensured that no category fell outside. A remaining difficulty would be, of course, that new means of B and C weapons are constantly being discovered and developed. The arguments which now forcefully speak in favour of seeking bans on all currently-known B and C weapons ought to apply also to such future means. But here we suggest that, as a follow-up to the proposed study, a continuous watch and periodic review be made in order to be sure that these prohibitions were being applied.

28. Let me now turn to the last chapters in our work in this field. Beyond the confirmation of and extended adherence to the Geneva Protocol and beyond the Secretary-General's scientific report, we must tackle the sequence of problems related to the possibility of prohibiting also the dissemination, production and stockpiling of B and C means of warfare, including the means of their delivery, which may be by aerosol spraying, the use of rats, and so on, and to prescribe their elimination. The Swedish delegation strongly holds that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee should not neglect work on these matters while waiting for success to crown the work on the preceding chapters which have so far figured more prominently in our deliberations. Indeed, we are asked by the General Assembly to tackle the whole topic. And we shall need considerable discussion to clarify all the issues involved. Thus it is better to start now.

29. As I have already indicated, the Swedish Government has no hesitation about desiring international agreements for bans in all the directions indicated. We are, however, aware of the need to study carefully the practical possibilities and, of course, the political opportunity of taking specific steps at specific times. It is a modest contribution to such a preliminary examination that I want to make today.

30. The difficulties which are often presented as veritable stumbling-blocks on the road to any agreed ban here, as so often, reside in the question of control. This makes it a natural centre of our attention. We have to recognize that perfect control over the production and possession of B and C weapons is simply not possible. What can be done is, as Mr. Mulley rightly stated on 6 August, to "provide arrangements which should satisfy States ... that they will not be exposing themselves to unacceptable risks."

(ENDC/PV.387, para.13)

31. The first measure, I venture to suggest, would be to attain a universal openness about activities in this field in order gradually to create confidence. Already all information available through scientific documentation is being nationally examined in order to assess the direction research activities are taking. There are a number of

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indications which could be discovered by careful readers of such reports, together with other available information, that research in and production, testing or stockpiling of B and C means of warfare or their means of delivery may be occurring. Further, public and scientific discussion, based on that open information, has led to spontaneous reluctance on the part of some scientific and technical personnel to participate in the search for or production of B and C means of warfare. When an international ban on such activities comes into being, coupled with openness about laboratories and factories, considerable protection against violations should be obtained already through an element of what one might call "control through public morale" -- or even "control through public shame".

32. Next, it would seem worth pondering whether an international agency, for instance the World Health Organization, could not undertake a key role in collecting, systematizing and disseminating all information pertaining to B and C weapons available from national and scientific sources. The world-wide control of diseases and epidemics is one of that Organization's normal functions, and such a continuous survey must be of utility for already-established purposes. It could at the same time serve the control function of monitoring any suspicious build-up of capabilities for B and C warfare.

33. Further, a system of periodic reporting could be worked out under which States would transmit information about resources, stocks and research in factories, stores and laboratories, about personnel employed, future plans, and so on. Needs for peaceful purposes should then be indicated. Obviously, the activities in the sphere of science which should be made the subject of reporting would have to be defined. Agreed lists might be drawn up and periodically revised by agreement.

34. Even more active steps in such a projected and gradually-expandable verification system would imply efforts to check against possible lacunae in the flow of information or suspicious trends, to press for further information, to question the appropriateness of certain research or stockpiling. That would, as a matter of fact, constitute the beginning of a process of "verification-by-challenge".

35. Finally, thought would have to be given to the acceptability of some system of inspection in loco, voluntary by mutual visits to laboratories by scientific experts, or prescribed in a treaty. Practically, the task would not be too difficult, particularly in regard to biological means of warfare. Inspectors could visit laboratories and factories of possible interest from the viewpoint of warfare capacity. The scientific documentation, plus the periodic reporting and the systematized

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compilation which I mentioned earlier, would constitute a preliminary control system and could then serve as a point of departure for possible further investigations by inspectors. The whole sequence might be made fairly similar to the control system provided by the IAEA safeguards for controlling the non-proliferation treaty.

36. So far I have presented what amounts to a few ideas which might be of value when we in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament plan our future work in the field of B and C weapons. And work we certainly must. The task before us is truly great, both in the labour needed and in the importance it carries. But I do not doubt that we have strong support for attempts to proceed in this field.

37. I believe that the great Powers have a very special self-interest in any international agreement on B and C weapons, as some countries which do not possess nuclear weapons might be tempted to procure B or C means of warfare as a kind of "ultimate" weapon. The balance of power is of no avail as a deterrent, since it might be upset if a quantitative or qualitative breakthrough were achieved by small Powers.

38. An additional reason for an agreement to stop production of B and C weapons is the one which I have often underlined in connexion with nuclear weapons -- that is, the great gains in resources to be made in terms of laboratories and medical and other high-level scientists. "Public health could be biological warfare in reverse" is a slogan full of truth. Vastly increased efforts could be devoted to combating mass diseases, producing vaccines, and so forth.

39. The time element is important. Fortunately the moral barrier, symbolized in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, is very strong against the use of these weapons; but there is an enormous risk of escalation in that field if the barrier is once broken. If we could succeed in prohibiting also production and possession, the barrier would be greatly strengthened.

40. For progress towards the banning of all work on B and C weapons we have a strong lever in public opinion. Without passing ethical judgements, it can be noted as a sociological fact that B and C weapons are considered as particularly abhorrent. The fact that means of mass destruction which can be used invisibly and surreptitiously are being produced frightens mankind. Activity in this field of applied science is being judged as a sign of how humanity is degrading itself.

41. To sum up, there is thus every reason to try to reduce the risk while there is still time, lest our proud human civilization should become the victim of a perversion of its own search for knowledge.

42. Mr. LAHODA (Czechoslovakia): First of all, I should like to say that we have listened with the utmost interest to the statement made this morning by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, and shall study it very carefully.

43. The provisional programme for our work, which we have succeeded in establishing in time for our future activities, accords top priority to the group of proposals in the field of nuclear disarmament. This fact corresponds fully to the significance of these questions and is in entire harmony with their urgency, which has been stressed repeatedly by all representatives during our summer session. While there is not the slightest doubt that nuclear disarmament issues have a specific place in the hierarchy of the tasks before us, the allocation of priorities within that group of questions has so far remained open. This will, I trust, be settled at a later stage when individual measures come to be discussed according to their merits.

44. The very wide scope of the agreed agenda provides us with sufficient space for dealing simultaneously with other important measures of partial disarmament and for seeking the most feasible solutions of the most important task -- general and complete disarmament. Although the Czechoslovak delegation places the main emphasis upon nuclear disarmament issues, it is ready to give its consideration to other questions which are ripe for solution and which, regarded realistically, have good prospects of being solved in a way acceptable to most of the countries concerned. For that reason my delegation fully endorses the proposal that the Secretary-General of the United Nations be asked to arrange for a group of experts to prepare a report on the effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, that report to be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations, to the Security Council, and to this Committee in order that it may serve as factual material to facilitate discussion of the problems relating to these weapons.

45. Since my delegation rightly sees the core of our work here to lie in the field of nuclear disarmament, permit me now to deal particularly with two problems: namely the underground test ban, and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. These are questions which have most attracted the attention of delegations on this Committee. This choice reflects the urgency of such measures -- an urgency emphasized, moreover, by recommendations contained in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly which

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have been quoted in this Committee on numerous occasions, and also by the provisions of article VI of the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226*), aptly brought to our attention in this context.

46. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is primarily a political matter. In substance, the prohibition might be effected by an obligation not requiring any complicated measures. At the same time it would facilitate and render more feasible the physical elimination of nuclear weapons, which is another of the targets of our common efforts and one of the fundamental objectives of general and complete disarmament. Such a procedure conforms to the reasonable principle of proceeding from limited and relatively not too exacting measures towards far-reaching and broader projects, from decisions mostly political in nature towards decisions technically more complicated.

47. The correctness and usefulness of such an approach have stood the test of practice during the past few years, which have seen the conclusion of well-known international treaties. We have come to understand that mutual trust is strengthened only by concrete projects undertaken jointly by the main nuclear Powers. Very often a mere change of political climate, improvement in the international situation and relationships among States, or possibly certain advances in science and technology, are sufficient to cast a different light on problems that have for long been insoluble and have seemed to constitute a Gordian knot -- which is then seen in a new form and quality offering new ways of cutting it.

48. After all, we may recall the agreement between the USSR and the United States of America to begin bilateral talks on the limitation and reduction of the numbers of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear delivery vehicles. This sufficiently illustrates my point. That question was amongst the key issues in the complex of general and complete disarmament until recently and was regarded as part of the comprehensive programme, as one of its principal points. Now we are witnessing the remarkable and generally-applauded agreement of the two decisive nuclear Powers to solve this problem separately by means of direct contacts.

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49. Past experience therefore justifies our hopes that an agreement on prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons will have a favourable impact on future negotiations concerning their ultimate elimination. Moreover, such an agreement would undoubtedly have a favourable reflection in an improvement of the international atmosphere, not to mention the consolidation of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and safeguarding them against potential nuclear attack or blackmail.

50. This question has been dealt with in detail by the representatives of Ethiopia, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic, Romania, India, Bulgaria and Poland, who have given us many convincing arguments in favour of a speedy solution of the issue. I therefore do not wish to carry coals to Newcastle and take up the precious time of members of this Committee. I wish only to recall that our situation is greatly facilitated by the fact that we have at our disposal for businesslike negotiations a fully-fledged draft agreement submitted by the Soviet Union (A/6834, pp. 3 and 4). After all, General Assembly resolution 2289 (XXII) (ENDC/210), containing the proposal for the convening of a special conference, also provides this very Committee with powers to negotiate an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We find the Soviet draft to be entirely satisfactory. Nevertheless, we are ready to consider any other proposals which may be submitted. In any case we ought not to miss any opportunity of making a step forward in this direction.

51. May I now proceed to another question which has rightly attracted attention during our debates on nuclear disarmament; namely the underground test ban? If any item on our agenda is highly urgent, it is this one. And, here again, I shall not go into the reasons for its urgency, which are well known, or refer to the relevant resolutions or statements made in this connexion by individual delegations. All of us know them only too well. May I say that on this question we seem to have reached the necessary agreement on the urgent need for a solution? Not a single delegation has ever denied this measure the preference which we have accorded to it in our order of priorities. We believe that this recognition may suffice for the time being in respect of the schedule of work before us.

52. Delegations of all countries on this Committee, including the decisive ones in this case, which are the nuclear Powers, share the view that the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is high in the scale of problems to be dealt with in the field of nuclear disarmament. However, the positions of some delegations differ as to the methods of

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control over the underground test ban, as to methods of ensuring that no clandestine explosions are carried out and that no country is testing and thus perfecting nuclear devices for military purposes. It seems that this is the only point of divergence; and we believe that it may be surmounted and the differing views reconciled in the course of future businesslike negotiations.

53. Our belief is not based on wishful thinking nor on our expectation that good will is to be manifested by all concerned. We are encouraged by the scientific findings in the field of the detection and identification of seismic phenomena and the useful exchange of scientific achievements on an international scale among highly-qualified experts of a number of countries, including Czechoslovakia. Their co-operation and fruitful discussions such as those recently concluded in Sweden will certainly produce new evidence of effective methods of reliable verification of underground explosions. The conclusions of the report of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research (SIPRI) Seismic Study Group (ENDC/230) on the reliability of control of the underground test ban through national detection means and the eventual negligible risks involved may greatly facilitate our efforts.

54. I am confident that the continued technical perfecting of seismological instruments and advances in scientific exploration will persuade even those who have questioned the efficiency of the national means of detection. Other delegations share with us this optimistic view of future developments. It has been a characteristic of the statements of the Swedish delegation and was reflected in the constructive approach to this subject by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, when he informed us (ENDC/PV.389, paras. 28 et seq.) of the recent research achievements of Canadian scientists in this field.

55. We need not be discouraged by the fact that there are different concepts of the ways and means of verification of the observance of the measure in question. We were in a similar situation when we discussed non-proliferation; and we remember quite well that the article on control in the non-proliferation treaty was formulated at the very end, shortly before the final wording of the instrument was reached.

56. Guided by the Committee's past experience, the Czechoslovak delegation believes that it would be most appropriate not to leave unexplored any possibility if it offers the hope of being helpful in our efforts to cope with the difficult tasks which we have before us and which we are in duty bound to accomplish as soon as possible. Therefore

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we have not abandoned the idea of a moratorium which would for some time complement the underground test ban up to a reliably detectable magnitude, as we have already said in our statement on 23 July (ENDC/PV.383, para.49).

57. In this connexion I should like to refer to the comment made by the representative of Sweden (ENDC/PV.385, paras. 22, 23) on my last statement on the subject; and I wish to say that we do not disregard problems of a technical nature with respect to specifying a threshold under which reliable detection of underground explosions may be safeguarded. We assume that the threshold will be set on the basis of exact methods corresponding to the level attained by science and technology. That is why we did not feel it necessary to insist on the figure specified in the 1965 proposal. May I add that we have appreciated the contribution made in this connexion by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf, in his inspiring statement on 15 August (ENDC/PV.390, paras. 38 et seq.), and we feel it may be very helpful in our approach to this problem.

58. The foregoing procedure which I have tried to outline would in the circumstances facilitate the immediate cessation of nuclear-weapon tests underground without necessitating a period of several years of limited experimental operation, as suggested on 16 July (ENDC/PV.381, para.77) by the representative of the United Kingdom -- a suggestion which would entail unnecessary on-site inspections. Thus we would do away with one of the principal obstacles which so far renders difficult the implementation of such an important measure.

59. U CHIT MYAING (Burma): I should like first of all to express my heartfelt thanks to my colleagues for the very kind welcome which they have extended to me. I have drawn much strength and encouragement from it in facing my new and, I must confess, rather unnerving responsibilities. While I have no illusions about the limited role which I as a newcomer and a representative of a non-armed country can play in this Committee, I should like to assure members of my sincere co-operation in their continuing search for practical solutions to the most dangerous problem facing mankind today.

60. In fulfilling that pledge I shall try to be objective and constructive. But if in the process I may sometimes display what might appear to be too much ambition and impatience for concrete results, it will be due to my inexperience and to the enthusiasm and idealism which so often afflict beginners. I for my part find comfort in the

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knowledge that whatever I may say here not only will receive the understanding of my colleagues, but cannot possibly jar a Committee which has again demonstrated its extraordinary fortitude and agility by performing the near-impossible feat of carrying on useful, orderly deliberations for a full month without an agenda.

61. I consider it to be a happy coincidence that I am taking up my responsibilities in this Committee at a time when the prevailing circumstances are acknowledged by all, including, significantly, the three nuclear Powers represented here, as being favourable to achieving progress in disarmament. My delegation cannot but agree with that assessment. We would go even further. It seems to us that there are now clearer signs indicating a renewed and stronger will on the part of the two major nuclear Powers earnestly to seek practical solutions to various disarmament questions. All this represents a positive development whose significance, both present and prospective, for those in pursuit of world disarmament need hardly be emphasized. I say that because prospects of achieving disarmament and arms control agreements of any consequence inevitably depend to a very large extent on the prevailing international political climate. And, as all of us know only too well, it is a fact of life that even the most carefully-devised disarmament plan will remain a dead letter so long as the major armed Powers are not prepared -- or, to use the popular description, "lack the political will" -- to carry it out.

62. The situation in that respect has now avowedly become better, but only after having remained frozen for many long years. That being the case, my delegation considers it absolutely essential that the present favourable political climate be fully utilized, while this is still possible, to secure the urgently-needed disarmament agreements. Those, in turn, cannot fail to generate further good will and understanding in the world. For that reason my delegation strongly supports the urgent appeals made earlier in the Committee that we lose no time in taking our tasks in hand with a view to finding agreed solutions to the various problems as speedily as possible. I must stress that this is the least that an impatient and watchful world expects of us.

63. What I have just said should in no way be taken as implying criticism of the Committee's work at this session. Indeed, my delegation has been highly impressed with the sober, businesslike note struck by all speakers during the current session and with the positive and constructive nature of their statements. We were also pleased to receive at the beginning of this session the memorandum of the Soviet Government (ENDC/227) and the message of the United States President (ENDC/228) containing an

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impressive number of important proposals for urgent consideration by the Committee. Some further important proposals and specific suggestions have been made by a number of other delegations in the course of the debate.

64. Finally, our Committee adopted last Thursday a formal agenda (ENDC/PV.390, para.93) proposed by the co-Chairmen which, even though it lacks the kind of precision and selectivity many of us would like it to have, is nevertheless a clear demonstration of our earnest and a definite commitment assumed by all of us to search resolutely for disarmament agreements at an early date, particularly in the nuclear field. All these have served to clarify positions, enabled us to fix our present bearings and, together with the various General Assembly resolutions, broadly defined the framework of our future work.

65. Thus, to my mind, the exercise we have been having since 16 July, far from being empty rhetoric, has been of the nature of preliminary exploratory discussions such as are necessary before concentrated work can start on the urgent priority questions. We consider, therefore, that the way has been cleared for the Committee to undertake that kind of work when its next session begins. In order that we should then find ourselves in a position to utilize our available time more profitably, my delegation would like to make two suggestions to the two principal nuclear Powers.

66. First, we should like to suggest to them -- in their capacities as co-Chairmen -- that they continue their consultations about the Committee's agenda with a view to determining the priority to be given as between the various items on the agenda adopted on 15 August. Though we consider that agenda to be helpful, and appreciate the effort that went into producing it, it can hardly be described as a negotiating agenda or an action agenda.

67. Our second suggestion is addressed to them in their capacities as the authors of the various disarmament and arms control plans submitted to the Committee since 1962. It seems to us from the statements of their representatives during this session that their basic positions on principal issues have remained solidly frozen over the years. An attempt must therefore be made to unfreeze the situation and induce movement. My delegation stands ready to do what little it can to help bring that about.

68. But if we are to be able to help, we must be helped in the first instance. That can be done only by the two nuclear Powers concerned. We would therefore earnestly appeal to both of them to take yet another look, searchingly and with an open mind,

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at their own old proposals as well as at each other's, in order to see whether some further accommodation cannot be made. Specifically, we wonder whether it would not be possible for them to put their plans through a sifting and sorting-out process, taking into account such substantive proposals as other delegations have put forward. At any rate, since those plans are now rather mouldy, a little exposure to the sunshine generated by the new spirit of understanding and increased confidence cannot but be beneficial.

69. Having said that, I should like to turn to those matters which the Burmese delegation considers should occupy the primary attention of the Committee at the coming sessions.

70. My delegation's fundamental approach to the question of disarmament can be stated very simply. We believe that the ultimate goal for the human race as a whole must always remain the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Indeed, we believe that there is no alternative to that. At the same time, we harbour no illusions about the difficulties that lie, necessarily, along the road to that objective. I say "necessarily" because that concept is so revolutionary, so bold, and so sweeping that we must expect to run into innumerable difficulties in trying to translate it into reality. General and complete disarmament raises a multiplicity of complex and delicate issues, such as balance, verification, and international peace-keeping, which go to the very heart of the security and sovereignty of nations. To solve those issues will take time and, perhaps, a further maturing of the spirit of internationalism.

71. If I have alluded to some of the difficulties attending the question of general and complete disarmament, it is not with the intention of arguing against the Committee's continuing to deal with that question, but to spotlight that area in the vast ambit of disarmament on which the Burmese Delegation has always urged the Committee to concentrate its immediate attention. That area comprises what are commonly referred to as collateral or partial measures of disarmament.

72. Our reasons are twofold. First, collateral or partial measures will effectively contain or reduce the dimensions of the armaments problem. They will therefore help ensure that the problem does not keep growing even as attempts are being made to solve it. They will help prevent the armaments race from reaching the point of no return, where disarmament becomes not merely difficult but impossible. Secondly, they

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generally offer better prospects of early agreement. Their impact on the security and sovereignty of individual nations is far less and their problems of balance and verification far fewer than is the case with general and complete disarmament. For those reasons my delegation earnestly hopes that the Committee, which in a sense is about to start things all over again, will, while continuing its search for an agreed formula on general and complete disarmament, set its immediate sights on achieving agreements on some of the more urgent and ripe collateral measures.

73. I feel I must here make it very clear that by taking this stand we are not advocating that the Committee restrict its attention to a small and insignificant part of the over-all disarmament problem. By "collateral measures" we understand measures designed to prevent a bad situation from getting worse, measures designed to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament, and measures which the armed Powers could take without jeopardizing their security. The area we have in mind, therefore, is fairly wide and covers all the measures listed in our agenda with the exception of general and complete disarmament.

74. Since the disarmament which we are seeking as our ultimate goal is to be general and complete, it goes without saying that collateral or partial measures aimed at bringing that goal nearer should embrace both nuclear and non-nuclear disarmament and all countries, large and small. But, having regard to the international realities of today, it seems to us that prospects of achieving arms limitation agreements in the area of non-nuclear armaments, including conventional armaments, are inseparably linked with prospects of achieving agreements in the nuclear field. It might even be said that agreements in the non-nuclear field await agreements regarding nuclear weapons and their carriers. Thus nuclear weapons and their carriers have become the heart of the disarmament problem. A breakthrough there could not fail to mark the start of a continuing process of arms control and disarmament in all fields.

75. In the light of that, my delegation wholeheartedly welcomes the agreement reached between the Soviet and United States Governments to enter into bilateral talks on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. We hope those talks will take place very soon, and we wish them every success. The attention of all the world will be turned to them anxiously and expectantly, for their course and their outcome are bound to have a profound and long-lasting impact on our own work here on related subjects, as well as on the peace and security of the world. In view of that, and in view of the highly sensitive nature of the talks, we would appeal to the parties to exercise the utmost restraint so as not to jeopardize their prospects in any way.

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76. In the meantime our Committee has a large number of important matters to tackle. As I stated earlier, we should go about this task on the basis of "first things first". Of the wide range of collateral and partial measures on our agenda, my delegation considers the question of achieving agreement on the banning of underground nuclear tests to be of the first importance. We hold that view for two reasons.

77. First, given the nature and orientation of the present phase in the nuclear arms race, which is towards greater sophistication, greater diversity and greater refinement of nuclear weapons, underground tests do in fact constitute the spearhead of nuclear escalation. They give birth to entire new weapons systems. It is a known and incontrovertible fact that large results, militarily, could be obtained from those relatively small tests. Therefore from the point of view of the nuclear menace underground tests now are as dangerous as, if not more dangerous than, were the tests in the other environments during the earlier phases of the nuclear arms race. That I am not exaggerating in making that assertion is starkly proved by the fact that before, during and since the nearly two years that we spent on the non-proliferation negotiations the nuclear arms race has been proceeding at a greatly stepped-up tempo, resulting in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons systems in quantity, quality and diversity, and adding new names, acronyms and even, I think, a nickname to the vocabulary of nuclear weapons.

78. Our second reason for urging first priority for that question is that in our view it is ripe for solution. We sincerely believe that the elements required to hammer out an agreement have long been present, and we are reinforced in that view by the further recent advances made in detection and identification techniques. In fact we cannot help recalling how tantalizingly close we were to achieving agreement on banning all -- I repeat: all -- tests late in 1962. The question has been so exhaustingly and searchingly considered that only a final resolute effort, with good will on all sides, seems needed now to achieve a comprehensive test-ban agreement.

79. We are not, of course, unmindful of the differences that still remain with regard to the identification as such, by seismological means, of underground nuclear explosions of very low yield. None the less we firmly believe that, whatever military risks this may involve for nuclear Powers, those risks cannot be compared with the enormous risks which continued testing underground entails for mankind as a whole. We very much fear that if underground tests are continued in those circumstances, the world at large will conclude that the political will to end the tests is absent.

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80. My delegation agrees with the view that the question of a comprehensive test ban is inseparable from the question of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. We have been told repeatedly that such devices are indistinguishable from nuclear weapons. It has even been said that the development work on both is identical. Given that situation, one might even say that any comprehensive test-ban treaty which did not prohibit all nuclear test explosions by all countries in all environments would in practice contain a big loophole which would sooner or later erode confidence and thereby jeopardize the existence of such a treaty.

81. Admittedly the problem is a complex one; but my delegation is confident that it is not beyond the collective ingenuity of this Committee to devise a satisfactory and workable solution. In all likelihood such a solution would in the end have to be patterned more or less on the idea of coupling a prohibitory agreement with a permissive agreement, which was first advanced by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, and which she admirably explained to the Committee on 6 June 1967 (ENDC/PV.302, paras. 20 et seq.). We think it is a pity that that idea has not received the attention which its merit commands. The problem will assume greater urgency as prospects improve for reaching agreement on a comprehensive test ban; and it would indeed be tragic if the conclusion of that agreement were to be retarded or its implementation delayed because of lack of agreement on an international régime to regulate peaceful nuclear explosions.

82. A useful beginning could be made by exploring the possibilities of reaching agreement on the fundamental principles on which the proposed international régime might be based. As I said earlier, such principles are inseparably linked with those to be embodied in the comprehensive test-ban treaty. Hence, in my delegation's opinion, they are essentially and basically political, and only a body like our Committee or the General Assembly is competent to consider them. Consideration of the other aspects of the matter, such as the modalities of implementation, may not be fully productive in the absence of agreement on fundamental issues.

83. Another collateral measure in the nuclear field which my delegation wishes the Committee to consider on a priority basis is the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes and the transfer of existing stocks of such materials to peaceful uses. This question can be usefully taken up with the item concerning the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction and

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subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles. Though one cannot expect results overnight and there can be no magic formulae for resolving the many admittedly complex issues involved, my delegation nevertheless cannot hide its disappointment that sufficient consideration has not been given to these very important matters. As many previous speakers have pointed out, progress in the forthcoming bilateral talks on missile limitation is bound to serve as a "shot in the arm" for our work on these questions. In the meantime, it would be helpful to know the latest thinking of the two major nuclear Powers on the substantive issues involved in these items.

84. Our present agenda contains a large number of other important items ranging over the entire field of nuclear and non-nuclear disarmament. Some of them have been carried over from our previous sessions, while others are new in the sense that they have not so far been subjected to any serious and thorough examination. These include chemical and bacteriological warfare, regional arms limitation, and the demilitarization of the sea-bed. Regarding these items, we shall need further time for reflection and study and are therefore not in a position to offer any substantive comments now.

85. I should like, however, to share a few very general thoughts with my colleagues. I shall not be making suggestions, still less proposals; I shall be doing nothing more than thinking aloud.

86. No nation committed to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control could take exception in principle to any practical proposal for arms control and disarmament, since general and complete disarmament applies to all countries and all types of armaments. The inclusion in our agenda of the items I have mentioned is therefore to be welcomed. This applies particularly to the proposed banning of chemical and bacteriological weapons, since the mass and indiscriminate death and suffering which they can cause and mankind's abhorrence of them rank them as second only to nuclear weapons. But if the international agreement that we seek is not to prove self-defeating, certain elementary rules will have to be observed. One is that, since we are required to legislate for the international community on a long-term basis, we ought to adopt a long-term and not a short-term outlook. It will therefore not be right to treat chemical weapons any differently from bacteriological weapons merely because momentary differences of opinion may exist at present regarding the former weapons.

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87. The Committee will recall that both the Soviet Union and the United States draft plans for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1; ENDC/30), submitted in 1962, call for the elimination during stage II of chemical and bacteriological weapons together with what were called radiological weapons. We have been hearing a good deal lately about the first two of that terrible trio, but nothing about the third. To be candid, my delegation knows practically nothing about radiological weapons and their potentialities. It seems to us that this is still a relatively virgin field so far as military exploitation is concerned. But considering that the rapid scientific and technological advances which are being made in our age have obliged us to agree to demilitarize even the heavens, this relatively virgin field should not perhaps be entirely forgotten. For all we know, a breakthrough in this field may soon be achieved or stumbled upon and the result may be an ultimate weapon more ultimate than the ABC varieties.

88. The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): With the permission of the Committee I shall now speak as representative of the United Kingdom.

89. The purpose of my intervention is to introduce on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation a working paper on the comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Committee will recall that my Minister, Mr. Mulley, in his statement of 16 July (ENDC/PV.381, paras. 76-78) made two specific suggestions for elements of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The first was for a special committee to consider complaints of infringement of the treaty and to assess the evidence produced in support of the complaints. The second was that, in order to facilitate agreement, the treaty could provide for annual quotas of underground nuclear weapon tests on a descending scale over a period of four or five years, ending with a nil quota after which further tests would be banned absolutely. In his statement of 6 August (ENDC/PV.387, paras. 31 et seq.) Mr. Mulley answered some questions which had been raised in connexion with those suggestions. The substance of the two suggestions by the United Kingdom is now, for ease of reference, set out in the working paper which is being distributed to the Committee, and I should be grateful if arrangements could be made for this working paper to be circulated as a Conference document (ENDC/232).

90. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic has transmitted to the delegation of the Soviet Union in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, whose head is a co-Chairman of the Committee, a Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on disarmament, with the request to bring it to the notice of the States Members of the Committee. The aforesaid Statement sets out the position of the German Democratic Republic on the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and on other measures of disarmament.

91. The delegation of the Soviet Union has today delivered a letter to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the request that it be circulated together with the attached Statement of the German Democratic Republic as a document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/233).

92. Permit me to read out the text of this statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic:

"I.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic welcomes the resumption of the negotiations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and congratulates the Committee on the successful conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It expresses the hope that in its future activities the Committee will soon achieve further positive results that could contribute to a relaxation of tension and the consolidation of peace.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic attaches exceedingly great importance to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which was drafted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and approved by the twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly. Consistent implementation of that treaty will reduce the danger of a devastating world thermonuclear war and facilitate and speed up measures in regard to arms restriction and disarmament. It will thus at the same time help towards the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe and a reliable international order of peace.

"Basing itself on this premise, the Government of the German Democratic Republic was one of the first to sign the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time the Council of State and the Government of

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the German Democratic Republic expressed the hope that the Government of the West German Federal Republic would likewise accede to the treaty. The West German Federal Republic, however, is delaying signing it, and in doing so it is obviously pursuing political and military aims.

"The conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which explicitly provides for further negotiations on measures towards effective disarmament, has brought about new, favourable possibilities for the adoption of specific measures in this field. The proposals put forward by the Government of the USSR in its memorandum on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament correspond perfectly well to these possibilities. The Government of the German Democratic Republic, at its meeting on 17 July 1968, expressed its complete agreement with the memorandum of the Government of the USSR and states also to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that it will steadfastly support the measures proposed therein towards arms restriction and disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. It holds the opinion that the implementation of this disarmament programme could free mankind from the nightmare of a thermonuclear war and expresses the hope that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will give due attention to those proposals.

"II.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic considers it to be its most urgent national task and international duty to prevent war from ever again starting from German soil. In view of the fact that the boundary between the two German States is also the principal line of contact of the world's two most powerful military coalitions, the vital interests of the peoples require that the Governments of the two German States should resolutely come out in favour of both world-wide and regional disarmament and actively support all measures directed towards that end.

"Accordingly, the Government of the German Democratic Republic has at all times supported suggestions for the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe and itself has proposed the conclusion of agreements between the Governments of the two German States on the renunciation of access to nuclear weapons in any form.

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"The establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, which should include the two German States, is all the more important because the Government of the West German Federal Republic is striving for a change of the status quo in Europe and calls for the seizure of the territories of other States, thus creating ever new, dangerous tension. The establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would do away with the danger of tension and explosion and create favourable prerequisites for safeguarding security in Europe. A measure of this kind would be in keeping with the proposition set forth in the memorandum of the Government of the USSR that "not only groups of States embracing whole continents or large geographical areas but also more limited groups of States and even individual countries may assume obligations to establish denuclearized zones".^{1/}

"At present the opposition of the West German Government to these proposals not only makes it impossible to establish a denuclearized zone in Central Europe but also hampers the establishment of denuclearized zones in Northern Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Danube area. The signing also by the West German Federal Republic of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which the German Democratic Republic has already signed, and the renunciation of nuclear weapons in any form, would remove one of the main obstacles to the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Europe extending from the North Cape to Sicily. It would open up prospects of far-reaching importance for safeguarding peace both in Europe and throughout the world. An agreement on the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would make it easier for the non-nuclear States to obtain from the nuclear Powers guarantees that would preclude the use of nuclear weapons against the countries forming part of the denuclearized zones in Europe.

"The Government of the West German Federal Republic, however, stubbornly opposes the implementation of such a plan for peace and security. It refuses to conclude treaties with the German Democratic Republic which are valid in international law because it wishes to have a free hand for acts of aggression contrary to international law. For this reason it also opposes the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe with the two German States forming part of it and is seeking for ways and means to put obstacles in the way of the implementation of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

^{1/} ENDC/227, p.4.

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"III.

"The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons drafted by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has so far been signed by approximately seventy States, including military allies of West Germany. But the West German Federal Republic delays signing the treaty. The West German Federal Chancellor, Dr. Kurt Georg Kiesinger, formulated the reasons for this approach as follows:

"The position of the Federal Republic differs from the positions of other States in that it is necessary for us to overcome what is called the status quo. That means that to overcome the status quo is for us an obligatory task. This does not apply to other countries."

(Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsantes der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 18 July 1968)

"Thus the West German Federal Republic dissociates itself from the policies of all other States. Its policy differs from the policies of other States in that it is the only State in Europe which does not recognize the territorial status quo and wants to change it, by force, if necessary. Hence its striving to secure the right to have control over nuclear weapons and its opposition to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

"The Government of the West German Federal Republic tries to cover up its position in regard to the treaty by declaring that it renounced nuclear weapons as long ago as 1954. But Federal Chancellor Kiesinger stated on 17 February 1967 that that "renunciation" referred only to "the manufacture of nuclear weapons in our own territory". He added:

"This new treaty renounces much more, that is, the rather theoretical case, in which nuclear weapons are manufactured in the territories of other countries or jointly with these other countries or with that other country; it also renounces the receiving of nuclear weapons which an existing nuclear Power would be prepared to transfer to us, and it is impossible not to see that, from the legal standpoint, the obligation goes much further ..." (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsantes der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 21 February 1967)

"That means that the Government of the West German Federal Republic has never really renounced nuclear weapons and even today does not want to do so, but seeks access to nuclear weapons and is preparing for their manufacture by

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itself or in conjunction with other countries. By these "other countries" the West German Government means above all the Republic of South Africa and Israel, that is, States with which it has already been co-operating in the nuclear field for a number of years.

"The West German Federal Republic's opposition to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is especially directed against the treaty's provisions on the control of fissionable material. The treaty provides for a uniform and universal control in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system. This system has already been put to the test and its effectiveness has been proved. It is applied by a great number of States to the complete satisfaction of the parties.

"The West German Federal Republic, however, wants to avoid this uniform international control which is exercised by the United Nations. It insists on control being exercised in the Federal Republic by the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). EURATOM, however, is nothing but an exclusive group consisting of six NATO States among which the West German Federal Republic is striving for leadership. Control by EURATOM would amount to nothing but self-control by the Federal Republic and the preclusion of a genuine and trustworthy international control.

"This position of the Government of the West German Federal Republic enables the conclusion to be drawn that it intends to continue its preparations - which are already in an advanced stage - for its own manufacture of nuclear weapons, without including in this process genuine and effective control.

"The Government of the West German Federal Republic also regards the creation of a so-called "European nuclear force" as a further stage on the way to gaining access to nuclear weapons. West German Federal Chancellor Kiesinger stated in this connexion:

"For me the most interesting aspect of the non-proliferation treaty has always been the European one ... I believe that a united Europe must be in a position to do for its defence what is necessary for a formation of that kind, that is, it must be free also to decide about its armament." (Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsantes der Bundesregierung, Bonn, 18 July 1968)

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"The West German Government bases itself on the argument that a Western European nuclear force would enable the Federal Republic to pursue its aggressive aims in regard to changing the territorial status quo and the frontiers in Europe.

"Moreover, the Government of the West German Federal Republic tries to justify its opposition to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons also by asserting the need for "enhanced security". But nobody threatens the security of the Federal Republic. The threat to the peoples of Europe comes exclusively from the Federal Republic and its striving for control over nuclear weapons. The security of the peoples of Europe requires the renunciation by the two German States of access to nuclear weapons in any form.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic, which is always guided by the idea that it is the moral and legal duty of the two German States to make special efforts in the field of disarmament and the restriction of the arms race, renews and confirms its proposals that

- the Government of the West German Federal Republic should abandon its opposition to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and sign the treaty without delay and without reservations;

- the two German States should join a denuclearized zone in Central Europe; and

- the Governments of the two German States should actively support the proposals - now before the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament - on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament.

"The Government of the German Democratic Republic assures the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of its readiness to participate, as far as it is able, in the accomplishment of these aims and justify to the full its responsibilities towards the German nation and the peoples of the world."

93. The statement which I have just read out is regarded by the Soviet delegation as an important document aimed at contributing to a constructive solution of the problems of disarmament and, above all, of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet delegation would like in this connexion to draw attention to the fact that the German Democratic Republic was one of the first States to sign the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Now the German Democratic Republic speaks out once again in favour of the speediest solution of important problems of disarmament.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

94. The formulation of vital questions of disarmament in the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic demonstrates the striving of the German Democratic Republic to achieve their speediest solution and thereby the strengthening of both international and European security. The Government of the German Democratic Republic, by making the Statement which has been put before the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, has once again convincingly demonstrated its profound interest in achieving the solution of a wide range of disarmament problems and in averting the threat of a nuclear war.

95. We hope that the aforesaid Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic, imbued with the desire to strengthen peace and security, will be considered with the fullest attention by the members of the Committee.

96. Mr. BUNN (United States of America): I wish to exercise, briefly, my right of reply.

97. We have commented before on the tiring and self-serving attempts of the authorities of East Germany to enhance their status. Once again they make unsupported allegations concerning the intention of the Federal Republic to acquire nuclear weapons. Those allegations are unfounded, have been shown to be unfounded in the past, and will be shown to be unfounded in the future. We regret that the Soviet Union has chosen to take up the time of the Committee with them.

98. Regarding the procedural question of handling this communication, I understand that, in accordance with past practice, the delegation of the Soviet Union wishes it to be circulated under cover of a letter from the representative of the Soviet Union and as a document of the Soviet delegation. If my understanding is correct, then the Soviet delegation is following the Committee's past practice, and we have no objection.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 391st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. W.N. Hillier-Fry, representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Burma, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States.

"The delegation of the United Kingdom submitted a Working Paper on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (ENDC/232).

"The following document was submitted:

'Letter dated 20 August 1968 from the representative of the Soviet Union addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General' (ENDC/233).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 22 August 1968, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

